PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
11/1/2025 – 11/30/2025
FIREFIGHTER CANCER PRESUMPTION
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Upper Merion Township VFD v. James Dolga c/o Therese Dolga (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 3, 2025
Issues:
(1) Whether the Board erroneously held that lay testimony was sufficient to satisfy Claimant’s burden of proof regarding documentation by reports filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Fire Information Reporting System (PennFIRS); (2) Whether the WCJ’s decision that Claimant established an entitlement to fatal claim benefits from adenocarcinoma of the esophagus pursuant to the firefighter cancer presumption is supported by competent evidence and pertinent authority?
Background:
Decedent served as a volunteer firefighter from 1974 to 2019. In September 2019, he was diagnosed with metastatic esophageal cancer, which ultimately caused his death on April 3, 2020. On July 1, 2021, Claimant/widow filed the Fatal Claim Petition pursuant to Section 108(r) of the Act, alleging that Decedent’s cancer resulted from his volunteer firefighting duties and seeking dependency benefits. Employer filed an answer denying the material allegations of the Fatal Claim Petition.
Holding:
The reporting requirements in Section 301(f) of the Act, do not impose the difficult burden on Pennsylvania’s volunteer fire companies of producing actual PennFIRS reports. Further, as the claimant succeeded in demonstrating an occupational disease and an entitlement to the evidentiary presumption of compensability, the burden of proof shifted to the employer, who failed to offer substantial competent evidence showing that the firefighter’s cancer was not caused by the occupation of firefighting. Here, irrespective of the epidemiological studies, the WCJ determined that Adenocarcinoma of the esophagus is the type of cancer possibly caused by IARC Group 1 carcinogens and is the cancer that caused Decedent’s death. Decedent served four or more years in continuous firefighting duties, had direct exposure to a Group 1 carcinogen and passed a physical examination prior to asserting a claim or prior to engaging in firefighting duties, and the examination failed to reveal any evidence of cancer. Upon review, the Court saw no indication of manifestly unreasonable judgment or inaccurate application of the law. Employer’s arguments merely go to the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. The WCJ, as the ultimate factfinder in WC cases, has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, and is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including a medical witness, in whole or in part. The WCJ may reject even a witness’s uncontradicted testimony.
Affirmed.
AMENDING THE NCP TO CHANGE THE INJURY DESCRIPTION
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Factory Grinding Service, Inc, et al v. Lane Hanna, et al.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: November 7, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ committed an error of law or abuse of discretion in granting the Petitions and finding that SWIF should reimburse Berkshire for 50% of the medical and wage loss benefits paid by Berkshire?
Background:
Claimant was hired by Factory Grinding on July 14, 2017, as a delivery person/salesman of knives and food equipment. Claimant’s job required him to travel to deliver products and follow up. He traveled to restaurants in Maryland and Pennsylvania twice a week in a company vehicle. Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in PA while on his way home from Maryland. At the time of the injury, Factory Grinding was insured by both Berkshire and SWIF. SWIF issued a medical-only NCP indicating “no physical injury.” Thereafter, Berkshire issued a NTCP in the nature of skull contusion, indicating that Claimant was in a motor vehicle accident and hit his head. Indemnity benefits were later started by Berkshire when Claimant started having lost work time after undergoing back surgery. In 2021 Berkshire issued an Amended NCP. The description of Claimant’s injury in the Amended NCP still read skull contusion even after the surgery and the paying of indemnity benefits. SWIF, in the meantime, paid some medical expenses that Claimant incurred three days after the accident, but denied all subsequent medical bills based on its understanding that there had been no physical injuries. In 2022, Berkshire filed Review and Modification Petitions, seeking to amend the description of injury. It argued that SWIF should have paid and should be paying 50% of indemnity and medical benefits and should reimburse Berkshire for 50% of the benefits already paid because Factory Grinding was insured by both SWIF and Berkshire on the date of injury. Subsequently, Claimant entered into compromise and release (C&R) agreements with both insurers on the same date. In the SWIF C&R agreement, the parties agreed that the claim accepted was medical only, with no specific injury identified. In the Berkshire C&R agreement, however, the parties agreed to preserve for adjudication Berkshire’s Review, Modification, and Joinder Petitions. By administrative opinion and order, the WCJ granted Berkshire’s Review, Modification, and Joinder Petitions. The WCJ directed SWIF to reimburse Berkshire for 50% of all wage loss and medical benefits paid by Berkshire to Claimant and further instructed that SWIF may only take credit for the limited medical expenses paid to Claimant, pursuant to the medical-only NCP. SWIF appealed the WCJ’s decision to the Board and the Board affirmed.
Holding:
The WCJ was obligated to make a specific finding as to whether the amended NCP issued by Berkshire was materially incorrect. Here, the WCJ did not formally indicate that he was amending the description of the injury contained in Berkshire’s amended NCP. However, logic dictates that the underlying amended NCP was materially incorrect, inasmuch as it specifically did not include the diagnosis that the WCJ found was included in the Claimant’s work injury. It was Berkshire’s position that the description of injury should be expanded to include injuries to the left shoulder, head, neck, and spine. It was SWIF’s position that the only issue before the WCJ was whether Claimant’s injury involved a low back injury leading to the surgery. Regardless of which NCP is considered, what is clear from the WCJ’s decision is that both SWIF’s and Berkshire’s NCPs should be modified. The WCJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and the WCJ did not err or abuse his discretion in denying the petitions. Where there is no dispute that the injuries suffered are work-related and where the question is which entity was the claimant’s employer, a petitioner may request modification. Berkshire was not precluded from seeking to transfer joint liability to SWIF. The evidence Berkshire relied upon for modification of the agreement was not available to it at the time it entered into the NCP because the aggravation of the degenerative disc disease developed after the NCP was issued. As noted, the WCJ was not required to go into a detailed legal analysis when he amended the description of injury. In the WCJ’s Findings of Fact he summarized the testimony from the witnesses and designated which testimony he found credible and not credible. His Conclusion of Law makes clear that Berkshire met its burden of proof, through competent medical evidence, to show Claimant’s work-related injury included an aggravation of Claimant’s degenerative disc disease. After reviewing the WCJ’s Decision, it was reasoned.
Affirmed.
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
William Zeller v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 3, 2025
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of a Claim Petition based on res judicata principles was in error?
Background:
Claimant worked as a police officer for the Employer for approximately 18 years. In 2021, while assigned to the Center City district, he tested positive for COVID-19. Employer designated Claimant’s first 10 months out of work as “E Time” in its payroll system and he received full pay without depleting his sick or vacation time. In January of 2022, Employer notified Claimant that after 60 days, he would need to use his sick or vacation time if he remained out of work, which he later began using. On January 25, 2022, Employer issued a Notice of WC Denial (NCD) on the basis that there was no medical evidence supporting a work-related COVID-19 exposure. Claimant filed a reinstatement petition in March of 2022, alleging that Employer unilaterally terminated his WC benefits after it had accepted the claim for his injury by paying him wages in lieu of compensation. The WCJ denied the Reinstatement Petition. Claimant appealed the decision to the Board, and while the matter was pending, he filed the instant Claim Petition alleging that he suffers from work-related “long-haul COVID.” Employer filed a motion to dismiss the Claim Petition as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as Claimant was seeking to relitigate the ultimate issue raised in his Reinstatement Petition, which was then pending on appeal. In 2024, the WCJ dismissed the “long-haul COVID” Claim Petition, concluding that Claimant was precluded from filing it because he raised issues identical to those pending on appeal before the Board. Claimant appealed to the Board, which affirmed.
Holding:
The instant Claim Petition is barred by the doctrine of technical res judicata. There is identity for the thing sued for in both actions, i.e., the entitlement to benefits for his COVID-19 related injury. Further, Claimant has already litigated his claim of entitlement to benefits arising from his March 5, 2021 contraction of COVID-19 in his Reinstatement Petition and was attempting to re-litigate the same ultimate issue through the present Claim Petition. Finally, the parties to both the Reinstatement Petition and Claim Petition proceedings are Employer and Claimant, and no issue has been raised as to their capacities to sue or be sued. Thus, the four technical res judicata criteria were met. Further, as the Board noted, Claimant originally filed only the Reinstatement Petition and could have instead simultaneously litigated a claim petition but chose not to do so.
Affirmed.
Barbara Tiano v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: November 3, 2025
Issues:
Whether the issue raised, the right to subrogation, was barred by collateral estoppel?
Background:
Claimant was employed as a police officer by Employer. Claimant sustained a work-related injury after falling into a utility hole. Employer accepted responsibility for Claimant’s injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. In lieu of workers’ compensation benefits, Employer paid HLA (Heart & Lung Act) benefits to Claimant. Claimant was awarded $450,000 from a settlement against PECO Energy Co., the third-party tortfeasor responsible for her injury. The WCJ found that Employer was not entitled to subrogation against payments made to Claimant under the HLA. Employer appealed. The Board affirmed in part, reversed the WCJ on the subrogation issue, and remanded for calculations of Employer’s subrogation entitlement for benefits paid to Claimant under the HLA. While this matter was pending, the issue of employer’s subrogation rights was decided in employer’s favor, via a prior decision of the Commonwealth Court, Tiano I.
Holding:
Consistent with Tiano I, the Court found that, because the third-party settlement arose from a non-motor vehicle-related cause of action, Employer had a subrogation right to paid HLA benefits from the date of the work injury. (See Tiano I). Collateral estoppel acted to foreclose this litigation as (1) the issue decided in the prior action is identical to the issue presented in this case; (2) a final judgment on the merits exists; (3) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party to the prior action and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the prior determination was essential to the judgment. The Court was presented with the same issues as from the previous litigation. Because there is a final judgment on the merits, and Claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these same issues in a prior action, collateral estoppel bars her attempt to relitigate these claims.
Affirmed.
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
ACT 121 – PTSI AND CHANGES TO THE ACT.
Effective October 30, 2025, Act 121 went into effect. The law amends the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act to transform how PTSI (post-traumatic stress injury) claims are handled under Pennsylvania’s workers’ compensation system. It eliminates the “abnormal working conditions” requirement and instead requires the claimant to establish that the injury was the result of a qualifying traumatic event sustained in the course and scope of employment. A “qualifying traumatic event” includes incidents involving the following: serious injury or death of an individual; injury, death, abuse or exploitation of a minor; immediate threats to life of the claimant or another; mass casualties or responses to crime scenes for investigations. In order for a first responder’s claim to qualify, the injury must stem from a defined traumatic event experienced during the course of employment. Eligibility for benefits is limited in duration, with compensation available for up to 104 weeks. The diagnosis of PTSI must come from a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist in Pennsylvania. Finally, claims must be filed within three years of diagnosis, and the triggering event must have occurred no more than five years before the law took effect. These changes apply to firefighters, police officers, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and other designated first responders.
Under this new standard, the PTSI must have resulted from a “qualifying traumatic event,” which is defined in the Act as 5 events, including: (1) incidents involving serious bodily injury or death, (2) mass casualty events, (3) crime scene investigations, (4) cases involving injured or exploited minors; and (5) involving an immediate threat of the life of the claimant or other individual.
Please note that this new law does not create a presumption that PTSI is work-related, eligible first responders still have to show that their PTSI is directly related to the qualifying traumatic event while on duty.
If a PTSI diagnosis arises after a responder leaves employment, the claim can still be brought against the employer of the claimant at the time of the exposure to the qualifying traumatic event which caused the injury.
There are exceptions. Injuries tied to disciplinary measures, performance reviews, job transfers or terminations are explicitly excluded from coverage.
House Bill 183 – No new action
A few months ago, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, House L&I Committee, voted on what is now designated as HB 183. This Bill expands access to workers compensation disfigurement benefits by increasing the duration of eligibility from up to 275 weeks to a new level of up to 400 weeks, extending the benefit to the entire body, and not just to the head, face and neck, and allowing these benefits to be paid simultaneously with indemnity benefits. The bill was passed by the House on April 7, 2025, and has now been referred to the Senate Labor & Industry Committee. It remains with this committee. It is worthy of note that this bill was amended, just prior to passage, to apply to injuries for which “permanent disfigurement was reached” after the effective date of the provision, whereas it was previously intended to only apply to injuries sustained on or after the effective date. As of today, there has been no new action.
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
11/1/2025 – 11/30/2025
Little v. VDM Metals USA, LLC
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
A-0561-24; 2025 WL 3276688
Decided: 11/25/2025
Background:
Plaintiff, Jonathan Little “Little,” worked as a material handler for VDM Metals USA “Defendant.” Plaintiff was injured during a fall at work. He was asked to help unload steel from a trailer. As he was exiting the trailer, he fell and sustained a head injury. He was wearing a helmet. A coworker provided testimony regarding the plaintiff’s employment and training. Everyone occasionally had to help unload trucks and was trained on how to safely do so. Plaintiff provided expert testimony that he did not receive proper training on how to unload a truck.
Plaintiff filed suit alleging negligence and that Defendant’s intentional wrongs caused his injury. The trial court found Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s conduct was sufficient to amount to the high bar of an intentional wrong. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred and that he established sufficient facts to show an intentional wrong.
Holding:
The court concluded that Plaintiff did not meet his burden on demonstrating an intentional wrong sufficient to overcome the Act’s exclusive application. To overcome the Act, it must be demonstrated that the Employer must know that his actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee and the injury and circumstances must be more than a fact of life of industrial employment and beyond anything the legislature intended to immunize. The court was not persuaded that Defendant acted with the knowledge that unloading the trailer was substantially certain to injure Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff did not demonstrate proof to overcome the intentional wrong prong of the workers’ compensation bar.
Affirmed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Assembly Bill 4750
Expands certain employer reporting requirements to include entities that employ or contract with individuals for financial compensation, including ridesharing and delivery technology platforms.
Last Action: January 14, 2025 – Received in the Senate, Referred to Senate Labor Committee
Assembly Bill 5198/S3772
Concerns valuation of board and lodging with respect to workers’ compensation.
Last Action: November 13, 2025 – Reported from Senate Committee, 2nd Reading
Assembly Bill 2637/S794
Concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships.
Last Action: December 5, 2024 – Reported from Senate Committee as a Substitute, 2nd Reading
