PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
08/1/2025 – 08/31/2025
STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
CLAIM WAS TIMELY
Frank Jordan v. Lost Forest Development, et al. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 19, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Board erred in finding that the claim petition was not timely filed?
Background:
On May 2, 2022, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that on May 3, 2019, when he was employed as a laborer by Employer, he sustained a work-related injury to his left shoulder that required surgery. The claim petition alleged that the incident occurred at a time when SCE had subcontracted with Employer to work on this demolition. Claimant served the claim petition on Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE, as well as Employer and SWIF. On May 3, 2022, the Department of Labor and Industry (Department) issued a notice of assignment that identified only Employer and SWIF as defendants and required them to file an answer within 20 days. On May 24, 2022, Claimant re-served the claim petition on Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE, along with the Department’s notice of assignment and SWIF’s answer. On June 15, 2022, Claimant filed a petition to join Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE. By order of July 3, 2023, the WCJ dismissed SWIF from the proceeding, finding that as of May 3, 2019, the date of Claimant’s injury, Employer’s policy had been cancelled for non-payment of premium. The WCJ also dismissed Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE. The WCJ found that the claim petition’s identification of Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE as statutory employers did not constitute a claim against them, and Claimant did not file separate claim petitions against them within the three-year statute of limitations. Likewise, the joinder petition was filed outside the three-year period and, thus, untimely. Nevertheless, the WCJ acknowledged that had Employer or SWIF filed the joinder petition, it would not have been barred by the statute of limitations. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s dismissal of SWIF from the proceeding because SWIF’s printout showed that it had cancelled Employer’s workers’ compensation policy on April 21, 2019. The Board rejected Claimant’s assertion that the WCJ’s dismissal of SWIF was premature.
Holding:
First, the Court held that the form of the petition filed is not controlling where the facts warrant relief, and that if a claimant is entitled to relief under any section of the Act, his petition will be considered as filed under that section. Claimant’s claim petition put Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE on notice of his theory of relief against them as statutory employers, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. The Board erred in otherwise holding. Second, here, the claim petition named Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE, and it contained factual allegations sufficient to establish their liability as statutory employer. The joinder petition was required only because Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE could not file answers in the WCAIS system. The Board’s adjudication cannot be reconciled with the Department’s regulation, which authorizes the use of a joinder petition to amend the “original petition.” 34 Pa. Code §131.36(h). Claimant’s joinder petition contained the allegations and claims against Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE that were contained in the original claim petition. Claimant’s joinder petition was an amendment to the claim petition authorized by 34 Pa. Code § 131.32(h). The Board erred in holding that the joinder petition was untimely filed. The joinder petition simply amended the claim petition to correct the Department’s error in not sending the notice of assignment to Lace Building, Scranton Lace, and SCE so that they could file responses in the WCAIS system. Third, the WCJ’s decision to dismiss SWIF from the proceeding was premature because discovery had not been completed.
REVERSED in part and VACATED in part and REMANDED.
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
WENEY REVISITED
Michael N. Lewis v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 11, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Review Petition was precluded?
Background:
Claimant worked as a police officer for Employer. On February 4, 2017, in the course and scope of his employment, Claimant sustained physical injuries to his hand/wrist, low back and chest wall, and thoracic spine. Employer acknowledged Claimant’s work injury through a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). Claimant elected to transfer into Employer’s heart and lung disability system. Following arbitration under the Heart and Lung Act, Claimant’s temporary benefits thereunder were terminated by agreement of the parties as approved by the City of Philadelphia Heart and Lung Arbitration Board on October 22, 2021. Separately, on April 15, 2021, Claimant filed Review Petition which sought to amend the injury description to include a concussion and concussion-related symptoms arising from the same work incident. In August 2021, the parties filed a joint stipulation resolving Review Petition. In the stipulation, the parties agreed that Employer would amend the NCP to include concussion, headaches, balance issues, and vision issues, and that Claimant could continue treating with Employer’s heart and lung program. The stipulation also stated: “The parties agree that this Stipulation does not prevent the parties from filing future petitions and other relief as appropriate pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act). The stipulation was approved. On September 20, 2021, Claimant filed Review Petition seeking to amend the work injury to include a psychological injury as a result of physical injury. The WCJ issued a decision granting Review Petition. The WCJ concluded that although Claimant’s mental injuries may have been manifest during the Review Petition proceeding, they were not part of that earlier litigation and so are not precluded under our decision in Weney. Employer appealed and the Board reversed the WCJ’s decision.
Holding:
Employer responds that the stipulation resolved Review Petition 1 and thus operates as a final judgment and has preclusive effect. Employer claims the stipulation does not authorize Review Petition because the clause does not specifically reference further “review petitions.” Further Employer cites the limiting phrase at the end of the waiver—“as appropriate pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act”—as suggesting that Weney still applies, since Weney was interpreting the Act. Employer maintains that nothing in the stipulation waived Employer’s defense under Weney. This matter is factually distinguishable from Weney. The Court did not feel that there was any concrete evidence that Claimant was aware before filing Review Petition that his psychological symptoms were either indicative of a particular, compensable injury or related to the work incident. The Court declined to address the effect of the Stipulation on the Weney argument. Claimant and his psychologist both acknowledged that Claimant was diagnosed with depression before the Review Petition was filed, but neither testified that Claimant was aware that his depression was a compensable work injury at the time of the Review Petition. The nature of Claimant’s psychological injury changed over time. Some of that change in Claimant’s condition occurred during the proceedings on the Review Petition. Also, Weney involved physical injuries that can be detected by diagnostic imaging or other direct observation of the physical tissues of the body. No such tests exist for psychological injuries, which are not directly observable. The Board erred in applying Weney in this factual circumstance to find that Review Petition was subject to technical res judicata.
Reversed.
PENALTIES AND COUNSEL FEES
SANCTIONS AND A LACK OF A DEFENSE
Day-Timers, Inc. v. Rhonda Horton (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 15, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Board erred by affirming the WCJ’s award of the Penalty and Counsel Fees to Claimant?
Background:
Claimant filed a Review Petition asserting Employer failed to pay the amount owed on the various Utilization Review Determinations. Employer filed an answer denying “[a]ll allegations regarding failure to pay medical bills … [and] also den[ying] that there [was] any violation of the [Act].” The WCJ issued its Decision which concluded Employer failed to timely pay the medical bills following the Determinations. The WCJ noted Employer presented no evidence to suggest it paid Provider and no evidence to explain why it failed to pay Provider in full, despite the uncontested Determinations. Accordingly, the WCJ determined Employer unreasonably contested the Review Petition because it filed denials to all material allegations in response to the Review Petition and presented no evidence to excuse the failure to pay Provider in accordance with the Determinations. Consequently, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Review Petition, ordered Employer to pay a 50% penalty on all unpaid and untimely paid medical bills from Provider under the Determinations, and awarded counsel fees to Claimant. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s Decision.
Holding:
Here, there was no dispute Employer failed to pay Provider the amounts due under the Determinations. Employer’s argument that Claimant was not aggrieved by the lack of payment to Provider was meritless. The Act does not require a claimant to suffer an economic harm before seeking penalties. Because Employer violated the Act, and it is within a WCJ’s discretion to award a penalty based on failure to timely pay medical bills, the WCJ did not err or abuse his discretion by awarding the Penalty. Further, based on the established meaning of the terms “shall” and “may,” under Section 440, when a contested case is resolved in favor of an employee, a reasonable sum for attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the claimant. Such an award is mandatory. Where, however, the employer has established a reasonable basis for the contest, the WCJ is permitted, but not required, to exclude an award of attorney’s fees. The question of whether there has been a reasonable contest depends on both the facts and the legal issues involved in each case, it is a question of law fully reviewable by this Court. The employer bears the burden of proving a reasonable basis for the contest, and the evidence must clearly establish the employer’s contest was not frivolous or undertaken to harass the claimant. The WCJ found Employer’s contest was unreasonable because Employer filed denials to all material allegations in response to Claimant’s Review Petition and then presented no evidence to excuse the failure to pay Provider in accordance with the Determinations. The WCJ properly noted Employer failed to present either proof of payment or the reason payment was not fully made. The WCJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. By denying all allegations regarding failure to pay medical bills in the Review Petition, but then offering no evidence of payment or explanation why it failed to pay Provider, Employer forced Claimant to incur counsel fees to litigate this issue. Employer failed to establish a reasonable basis for contesting Claimant’s claim and, accordingly, under Section 440 of the Act, Claimant was entitled to Counsel Fees. Therefore, the WCJ did not err by awarding Claimant Counsel Fees.
Affirmed.
NOTICE OF THE INJURY
THE CLAIMANT’S BURDEN
Kimberly-Clark Mill v. William Moss, Jr. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 12, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ’s Decision and Board’s Order were supported by substantial competent evidence and the WCJ capriciously disregarded evidence in determining Claimant provided timely notice of his work injury to Employer?
Background:
Claimant filed a Claim Petition seeking benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. In his Claim Petition, Claimant alleged he was electrocuted while vacuuming at work. Claimant asserted the electrocution caused him severe tremors. Employer denied Claimant’s allegation that he was injured at work and alleged Claimant’s injuries were preexisting. The WCJ concluded Claimant satisfied his burden of proving he sustained a work-related injury in the course and scope of his employment. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s Claim Petition.
Holding:
Claimant did not fail to establish he provided Employer timely notice of his work injury. The employee need not provide employer with an exact diagnosis of a work-related injury, but rather, a reasonably precise description of the injury is sufficient. Importantly, a claimant is not required to give notice in a single communication, and conversations between a claimant and an employer are not considered in isolation. In considering whether adequate notice has been provided to an employer, the context of the communications between the claimant and the employer concerning the work-related injury is relevant. It is clear that Claimant’s expert’s testimony did not waiver, was not uncertain, vague, or doubtful, and thus was unequivocal. Accordingly, Employer’s argument that this testimony did not rise to the level of substantial competent evidence is without merit. Employer’s assertion that Claimant’s expert’s testimony is incompetent lacks merit, as it was not supported by the record. The WCJ acknowledged the conflicting medical testimony, the surveillance footage, and the two years Claimant worked after the 2018 electrocution as his symptoms progressed, and the WCJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence of record. The WCJ assessed the conflicting medical testimony and found Claimant’s medical witness to be more credible than Employer’s medical witness regarding Claimant’s injuries and their work-relatedness. The WCJ did not capriciously ignore relevant competent evidence in rendering his decision. Insofar as Employer seeks to have this Court reweigh the evidence, the WCJ, as the factfinder, has the sole authority to assess credibility, to resolve conflicting evidence, and to determine the weight given to the evidence. The Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s Decision.
Affirmed.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. v. Andrew Son (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 26, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ’s decision is based upon substantial competent evidence?
Background:
In a March 2, 2023 order, the WCJ granted two Claim Petitions on the ground that Claimant sustained a cervical strain and sprain in the October 21, 2021 incident, and a concussion with a post-concussion syndrome resulting from the November 15, 2021 incident. Employer appealed to the Board, which affirmed.
Holding:
The competency of medical testimony is a question of law fully reviewable on appeal and is distinct from the question of credibility. The testimony was competent. Employer is essentially asking this Court to overturn the WCJ’s credibility determinations, which the court cannot do, as there is substantial evidence to support the findings. There has been no abuse of discretion or capricious disregard of Employer’s competing evidence. It is well settled that questions of credibility and the resolution of conflicting testimony are within the exclusive province of the WCJ and are not subject to appellate review. Because Claimant’s expert’s testimony was both competent and equivocal, and because the WCJ’s credibility determinations were carefully explained in his factual findings, they must stand on appeal.
Affirmed.
STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS
Altoona Housing Authority v. Garrett Beckenbaugh, et al (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 15, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Board erred by determining that the Housing Authority was Claimant’s statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Act?
Background:
In October 2018, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging he suffered a disabling injury on May 15, 2017, after falling off a roof at the Housing Authority’s Fairview Hills Housing Development while in the course and scope of his employment as a laborer for Kylor Contracting. Kylor’s insurer, issued a Notice of Denial. In January 2019, Claimant filed a claim petition for benefits from the Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund (the Fund) alleging Kylor did not maintain workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The WCJ found Claimant met his burden and granted Claimant’s claim petition against Kylor. Additionally, the WCJ found that the Housing Authority was Claimant’s statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Act. Having concluded the Housing Authority was Claimant’s statutory employer, the WCJ dismissed Claimant’s claim petition for benefits from the Fund. The Board affirmed. The Housing Authority now appeals.
Holding:
Under Section 302(a) of the Act, a contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract is liable for workers’ compensation to the employees of the subcontractor in the event the subcontractor that is primarily liable has failed to secure coverage. Section 302(a) of the Act further provides, in relevant part, that for purposes of this section, “a person who contracts with another … to have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the business … of such person shall be deemed a contractor, and such other person a subcontractor.” Here, the WCJ found, the Housing Authority’s business is to maintain its public housing units. Ultimately, the Housing Authority, being in the business of providing and maintaining housing, is responsible for ensuring that its housing facilities have roofs, and that those roofs are maintained. To fulfill this responsibility, the Housing Authority hires contractors to perform necessary roof work. In light of these facts found by the WCJ, the Board correctly concluded that maintaining the roofs of its housing facilities is a “regular or recurrent part” of the Housing Authority’s business.
Affirmed.
NOTICE TO THE UEGF
TIMELINESS
Vidal Almendarez Diaz v. UEGF and Bravo Remodeling (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decision: August 8, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ erred in granting the UEGF’s motion to dismiss based on the conclusion that the Claimant did not provide timely notice to the Fund pursuant to Section 1603(b) of the Act?
Background:
On July 28, 2019, Claimant suffered a lower back injury. Claimant notified Employer of his work injury that same day. On January 9, 2020, Claimant filed a notice of claim with the Fund pursuant to Section 1603 of the Act. Thereafter, in February 2020, Claimant filed a claim petition against the Fund. The Fund filed an answer denying all material allegations in the claim petition, including that Claimant timely notified the Fund of his claim. The WCJ granted the Fund’s motion to dismiss based on the conclusion that the Claimant did not provide timely notice to the Fund pursuant to Section 1603(b) of the Act. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
The WCJ’s finding that Claimant failed to provide timely notice of his claim to the Fund is not supported by substantial evidence. The WCJ appears to have used a constructive knowledge standard and inferred that Claimant should have known Employer was uninsured. That is not the standard. The Act provides that the time period for giving notice to the Fund is measured from when a claimant has been advised that the employer is uninsured. The only evidence of record that clearly establishes when Claimant was advised that Employer was uninsured is an email Claimant’s Counsel received from the Bureau. Because Claimant filed a notice of claim with the Fund 28 days later he provided timely notice pursuant to Section 1603(b) of the Act. However, this testimony as to lack of notice is vague and is contradicted by Claimant’s later statements. Moreover, the WCJ did not make any findings of fact with respect to this portion of Claimant’s testimony, nor did he cite this as one of the three scenarios when explaining the reasoning for his decision. The finding that Claimant did not provide timely notice of his claim to the Fund is not supported by substantial evidence and the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s decision granting Employer’s motion to dismiss.
Reversed and Remanded
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
House Bill 183
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, House L&I Committee, voted on what is now designated as HB 183. This Bill expands access to workers’ compensation disfigurement benefits by increasing the duration of eligibility from up to 275 weeks to a new level of up to 400 weeks, extending the benefit to the entire body, and not just to the head, face and neck, and allowing these benefits to be paid simultaneously with indemnity benefits. The bill was passed by the House on April 7, 2025, and has now been referred to the Senate Labor & Industry Committee. It remains with this committee. It is worthy of note that this bill was amended, just prior to passage, to apply to injuries for which “permanent disfigurement was reached” after the effective date of the provision, whereas it was previously intended to only apply to injuries sustained on or after the effective date. As of today, there has been no new action.
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
8/1/2025-8/31/2025
Brooks v. Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Superior Court of New Jersey – Unpublished Opinion
A-1013-23; 2025 WL 2248778
Decided: 8/7/2025
Background:
Petitioner Leon Brooks (hereinafter Brooks) worked as a custodian for Rutgers until 2013, when he was terminated as Rutgers found him unable to physically perform the duties of his position. Brooks filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging pulmonary and orthopedic injuries. The pulmonary aspect of the claim was settled. After trial, the Judge determined that Books had established the probability that his orthopedic injuries stemmed from his work at Rutgers. The Judge found that Books suffered disability of 74% permanent partial total. Rutgers appealed arguing the Judge erroneously found the employment caused the injuries. Brooks cross-appealed arguing the Judge incorrectly determined he was not 100% disabled.
Holding:
The court found the Judge did not misuse her discretion in finding Brooks met the burden of establishing a probability that he suffered a compensable occupational injury. The Judge’s determination relied on the credible evidence in the record, not on Brooks’s subjective complaints. Further, Rutgers hired Brooks after he passed a physical and later terminated him finding that he had physically deteriorated. There was no evidence of subsequent accidents or injuries outside of work. The court found that the conclusion that the work activities exacerbated Brooks’s condition to a compensable degree was supported by the record. The court additionally deferred to the Judge’s discretion in determining the degree of Brooks’s disability and did not find an improper exercise of discretion.
Affirmed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Assembly Bill 4750
Expands certain employer reporting requirements to include entities that employ or contract with individuals for financial compensation, including ridesharing and delivery technology platforms.
Last Action: January 14, 2025 – Received in the Senate, Referred to Senate Labor Committee
Assembly Bill 2100/S1470
Provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
Last Action: September 19, 2024 – Reported out of Asm. Comm. With Amendments, and referred to Assembly Public Safety and Preparedness Committee
Assembly Bill 5198/S3772
Concerns valuation of board and lodging with respect to workers’ compensation.
Last Action: January 23, 2025 – Reported and Referred to Assembly Appropriations Committee
Assembly Bill 2637/S794
Concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships.
Last Action: December 5, 2024 – Reported from Senate Committee as a Substitute, 2nd Reading
Assembly Bill 5792/ S4590
Provides for workers’ compensation coverage of certain counseling services for first responders and provides that certain mental health related communications are confidential.
Last Action: August 21, 2025 – Approved P.L.2025,c.134.
Result: Employers of first responders are required to pay for up to 12 hours of paid confidential counseling compensable under the provisions of the worker’s compensation law for a first responder who experiences a critical incident in the course and scope of the first responder’s employment. The first responder can select the mental health professional to provide counseling. If the mental health professional determines the first responder needs more than 12 hours of counseling, the Employer is required to pay for up to an additional 24 hours of counseling. Critical incident includes events such as firing a weapon, being involved in an exchange of gun fire, receiving a serious bodily injury, witnessing certain serious bodily injuries and deaths, and being involved in certain investigations related to minors.
