PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
10/1/2025 – 10/31/2025
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
SUFFICIENT, COMPETENT, EVIDENCE
Merck Sharp & Dohme v. Nakeisha Williams (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 23, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ erred in relying on Claimant’s expert testimony to expand the description of the work injury?
Background:
Claimant was struck on the bridge of her nose by a plexiglass door while working for Employer as an animal care specialist technician II and sustained injuries. Employer accepted injuries described as a facial laceration of the nose and concussion without loss of consciousness via a converted Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable. Employer filed a Termination Petition asserting Claimant was fully recovered from the work injuries, based on an IME. Claimant filed a Review Petition requesting that the description of the work injury be expanded to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), chronic post-traumatic headaches, and functional neurological symptoms disorder (FNSD). The WCJ concluded that Claimant had met her burden of proof on the Review Petition and that Employer had met its burden of proof on the Termination Petition only as to Claimant’s work-related concussion. Accordingly, the Board affirmed.
Holding:
A claimant must establish the causal connection between their work and the injury through unequivocal medical testimony, and the Court must review the testimony of a witness as a whole and not take words or phrases out of context. Examining the record in the light most favorable to Claimant, there is credited, relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant suffers from work-related ongoing post-traumatic headaches and is receiving treatment for those headaches; therefore, that finding is supported by substantial evidence and is conclusive on appeal. There was no error in the Board’s affirmation of the expansion of Claimant’s work-related injury to include post-traumatic headaches and FNSD. Further, Claimant was entitled to ongoing partial disability benefits based on the work restrictions imposed. From a review of the entire record, a reasonable mind might consider the Claimant’s evidence adequate to support the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant’s work restrictions are associated with her work-related ongoing post-traumatic headaches and FNSD, that finding is supported by substantial evidence and is conclusive on appeal. Claimant testified that prior to being injured she worked overtime, overtime was available when she returned to work, and she was not able to work overtime after the injury. Claimant confirmed that she was earning less than before she was injured. This evidence supports the finding that Claimant has suffered a loss of earning power as a result of the work restrictions imposed by Dr. Kerrigan and the conclusion that Claimant was entitled to partial disability benefits. There was no error in the Board affirming the WCJ’s Decision granting the Review Petition and amending the description of Claimant’s work injury to include FNSD and post-traumatic headaches because Claimant met her burden of proof on the Review Petition.
Affirmed.
Cambria County Transit Authority v. Ralph E. Bretz, Jr. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 17, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ improperly expanded the description of Claimant’s injury? Whether Employer’s own evidence was competent and credible and sufficient to meet its burden?
Background:
Claimant sustained a work injury when he slipped and fell while leaving his personal vehicle in Employer’s parking lot, sustaining contusions. Employer admitted liability and later Employer filed its Termination and Suspension Petitions, asserting full recovery as of an IME. The WCJ ruled that Employer failed to meet its burden on either the Termination Petition or the Suspension Petition.
Holding:
In order to suspend a claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits, an employer bears the burden of proving either that there is work available within the claimant’s physical restrictions or that his loss of earnings was caused by something other than the work-related injury. To succeed in a termination petition, an employer bears the burden of proving by substantial evidence that a claimant’s disability has ceased or that any remaining conditions are unrelated to the work injury. Where an injury naturally flowing from the NCP injury is similar in kind to the one described in the NCP the employer still bears the burden of proving or disproving the causal relationship even where the precise injuries are not listed in the NCP. It does not matter whether there is evidence in the record which supports a factual finding contrary to that made by the WCJ. The pertinent inquiry is whether there is any evidence which supports the WCJ’s factual finding. Even if it is true that substantial evidence supports Employer’s assertions, that is insufficient to satisfy its burden of proof. The appellate Court may not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, but may only determine whether the WCJ’s findings have the requisite measure of support in the record as a whole. As substantial evidence of record supports the WCJ’s finding that Claimant is not yet recovered from his work injury, Employer does not provide a valid basis for disturbing his factual findings.
Affirmed.
YELLOW FREIGHT
ADEQUATE EXCUSE
Charles Lucke v. Kost Tires Distributors (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 9, 2025
Issue:
Whether the WCJ erred by not requiring both Employer and its insurer to establish an “adequate excuse” for Employer’s untimely answer?
Background:
Claimant filed his Claim Petition alleging he sustained various back and hip injuries while working for Employer. The Claim Petition did not identify Employer’s insurer. Employer’s Answer was untimely and Claimant made a Yellow Freight Motion. Regarding Employer’s late filing of its Answer, Employer presented the testimony of Employer’s operations and development manager. The Manager observed Claimant’s Claim Petition, which listed Employer’s address in Eynon, Pennsylvania, and testified Employer was not located there at the time Claimant filed the Claim Petition because a main water line break closed the property, and the building was uninhabitable. The WCJ accepted Manager’s testimony that Employer did not receive a copy of Claimant’s Claim Petition because Employer’s Eynon location had flooded and it did not receive mail sent to that location. Moreover, the WCJ noted Employer’s insurance company was not listed on the Claim Petition. The WCJ found Employer’s explanation reasonably explained why Employer’s Answer was not filed timely, but noted it filed its Answer as soon as it received the Claim Petition. The WCJ found Claimant’s testimony “less than credible,” finding Claimant did not sustain a work-related injury while employed with Employer. The Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
Holding:
Generally, where an employer files an untimely answer to a claim petition, every factual allegation in the claim petition is deemed admitted, and an employer is precluded from presenting evidence in rebuttal or as an affirmative defense. An exception to this rule exists where an employer has good cause for its late filing, based upon evidence of an adequate excuse for its late answer. An adequate excuse does not include factors within an employer’s control. Here, the record substantially supports the WCJ’s findings. Once the employer is properly served, the carrier cannot claim that it did not receive actual notice of the claim. The employer has the responsibility to defend against a claim, as well as the burden of notifying its insurance carrier of a claim against it. Because the law treats the employer and insurance carrier as a “single entity,” there is no rule that employer and its insurance carrier must each provide an “adequate excuse” for an employer’s untimely answer to a claim petition. Therefore, there is no merit in Claimant’s argument the WCJ erred by not requiring an “adequate excuse” from Employer’s insurance carrier in addition to Employer’s reasoning. The WCJ’s denial of Claimant’s Yellow Freight Motion was not in error. Further, as Claimant did not prevail on his Claim Petition, he is not entitled to an award of costs under Section 440 of the Act.
Affirmed.
RES JUDICATA
Sarapee Hirankarn v. Grittiya Phutlek (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: October 30, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Employer may challenge the determination that Claimant fell while employed by him?
Background:
In 2015 Claimant sustained a work-related injury when she fell down several stairs while carrying produce at Employer’s restaurant. The WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petitions against Employer and the UEGF and awarded limited benefits, followed by a suspension. A few years later Claimant filed a petition for reinstatement that was granted by the WCJ. Therein, the WCJ reinstated Claimant’s benefits for a limited period, followed by another suspension. This latter determination accepted various additional diagnoses from Claimant’s work injury. Thereafter, Claimant filed the instant petition to reinstate, seeking ongoing indemnity benefits. The WCJ granted Claimant’s reinstatement petition and reinstated Claimant’s total disability benefits. Employer, appearing pro se, attempted to collaterally attack Claimant’s underlying claim petitions. Specifically, Employer argued that Claimant did not fall in his restaurant and that her injuries were not related to her employment. The Board rejected this argument, as the issue of whether Claimant sustained a work injury had been previously litigated.
Holding:
Employer was barred from making the argument raised. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the Court from addressing Employer’s arguments in this case. In this case, the causal connection between Claimant’s work and her injury was obvious: Claimant fell down the stairs at work while carrying supplies into a storage area, immediately causing her pain. Claimant further supported her claim with medical records detailing the extent of her injuries and treatment. The WCJ found Claimant’s testimony credible. Further, the WCJ determined that the medical records Employer provided were not related to the work injury. Because the issue of the cause of Claimant’s work-related injury was actually litigated in Claimant’s original claim petition proceeding, the issue cannot be challenged now in the context of her petition to reinstate.
Affirmed.
MENTAL/MENTAL INJURY
FIREFIGHTS AND ABNORMAL WORKING CONDITIONS
Brian Ganley v. Upper Darby Township (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: October 22, 2025
Issue:
Whether the decisions of the Board and WCJ, that the death of two infants after Claimant unsuccessfully performed CPR on them is a normal working condition for a firefighter?
Background:
Employer employed Claimant as a firefighter from 2001 until May 2021, when he took a medical leave of absence. In his final two and one-half years as a firefighter, Claimant twice experienced events in which he performed CPR on infants who were not breathing, both of whom he was unable to revive. Claimant continued to work for Employer but suffered from mental issues related to the first incident. After the second incident, Claimant’s mental health symptoms intensified, and he left his duties as a firefighter. As a result of these two incidents, Claimant experienced mental issues including anxiety, depression, anger, PTSD, loss of appetite and sleep, and nightmares. Claimant stopped working as a firefighter because of these symptoms. Except for these two incidents, Claimant never had to perform CPR on any other infant, and no other infant or baby died in his presence. The parties did not dispute Claimant suffered PTSD because of his work-related duties as a firefighter. The dispute was whether the causal events amounted to abnormal working conditions. Expert and fact witnesses were produced by both sides. Notably, Employer presented the testimony of Employer’s fire chief. Among other things, the chief admitted having to perform CPR on a child under five years of age is rare, but that, during his career, persons of all ages have died of smoke inhalation from fires; individuals come to a fire station for medical reasons; and firefighters perform CPR on individuals who are not revived. The chief testified Claimant’s administration of CPR to the two infants was a “normal” part of a firefighter’s job and something that they are trained for, albeit, rare. However, he testified that death is not a rare experience. The WCJ resolved the conflicts in testimony on the key issue of whether the incidents experienced by Claimant were rare or unusual in favor of the chief, whom he found totally credible. The WCJ reached the legal conclusion that Claimant did not establish the causative events were abnormal. Although traumatic, they were simply not extraordinary or abnormal for first responders.
Holding:
When it comes to questions of credibility and acceptance of evidence, the WCJ is the ultimate fact finder in workers’ compensation cases and is entitled to weigh the evidence and assess credibility of witnesses. The Court will not disturb a WCJ’s findings so long as there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings. In psychological injury cases, the issue of whether a claimant has established abnormal working conditions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In classifying working conditions as normal or abnormal, the Court does not employ a bright line test or a generalized standard, but instead, considers the specific work environment of the claimant. A high-stress working environment constitutes a legally sufficient abnormal working condition where there is a finding either that the claimant’s work performance was unusually stressful for that kind of job or a finding that an unusual event occurred making the job more stressful than it had been. Here, the WCJ found Claimant proved he suffered an injury and resultant disability from his working conditions. However, the WCJ determined Claimant did not establish the causative working conditions at issue were “abnormal.” However, the WCJ’s determination that Claimant did not endure an abnormal working condition constituted a conclusion of law, which is subject to the Court’s de novo standard of review. Thus, the appellate Court is not bound by the WCJ’s legal conclusions.
The Court applied the facts found by the WCJ, and rendered a separate legal conclusion that an abnormal working condition caused Claimant’s injury. The Court noted that the Claimant performed CPR on and witnessed the deaths of two infant children within a 16-month period. It was the compounded effect of these two incidents that caused Claimant’s disabling PTSD. Certain events, even in high-stress professions, may rise to the level of abnormal working conditions. In Claimant’s 20 years’ experience in firefighting service before the first event, Claimant had never before had to perform CPR on an infant. There is no evidence in the record that suggests firefighters routinely or normally perform CPR on infant children or witness the deaths of infant children. The record established both the rarity of these events and the potential for substantial psychological impact to the participants. While relevant, Claimant’s training is not dispositive. Claimant proved the conditions he faced were unusually stressful when compared to the usual working conditions of firefighters. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the facts found by the WCJ established the existence of an extraordinarily unusual and distressing combination of events experienced by Claimant which resulted in his disabling mental condition. The package of these tragedies, and Claimant’s direct involvement in them, constituted an abnormal working condition. Accordingly, the Board erred as a matter of law by failing to conclude that the facts found by the WCJ established the existence of an abnormal working condition. The Court reversed the Board’s order affirming the WCJ’s denial of Claimant’s claim petition and remanded the matter to the Board to remand to the WCJ for the calculation of an award of disability benefits associated with Claimant’s work injury and attorney’s fees.
Reversed, and Remanded.
A CONCURRING OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER
Judge Leadbetter expressed her view as to the continued viability of the “abnormal working conditions” doctrine. And her belief it is time to scrap the “abnormal working conditions” doctrine altogether and hold that if there is clear proof of a disabling work-related mental injury, it should be compensable.
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
House Bill 183
A few months ago, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, House L&I Committee, voted on what is now designated as HB 183. This Bill expands access to workers’ compensation disfigurement benefits by increasing the duration of eligibility from up to 275 weeks to a new level of up to 400 weeks, extending the benefit to the entire body, and not just to the head, face and neck, and allowing these benefits to be paid simultaneously with indemnity benefits. The bill was passed by the House on April 7, 2025, and has been referred to the Senate Labor & Industry Committee. It remains with this committee. It is worthy of note that this bill was amended, just prior to passage, to apply to injuries for which “permanent disfigurement was reached” after the effective date of the provision, whereas it was previously intended to only apply to injuries sustained on or after the effective date. As of today, there has been no new action.
.
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
10/1/2025 – 10/31/2025
Lewis v. Dicks
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
A-2781-23; 2025 WL 2848336
Decided: 10/8/2025
Background:
Al-Jaquan Lewis “Lewis” was a passenger in a Vino Trucking box truck driven by Isaiah M. Dicks “Dicks” when it collided with another vehicle. Lewis was injured in the accident and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The workers’ compensation claim settled. Before the workers’ compensation claim settled, Lewis filed a negligence claim alleging the trucking company breached their duty of care that proximately caused his injuries. The trucking company moved for summary judgment stating that the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits barred his action.
Holding:
The court concluded that Lewis was a regular employee of Vino Trucking and received workers’ compensation benefits. The negligence claim does not overcome the workers’ compensation bar because there is no contention that the injuries were caused by the employer’s intentional wrongs. Further Lewis presented no evidence that he was an independent contractor. As such, the negligence claims against Vino Trucking were dismissed.
Affirmed.
HOLIDAY PAY WHILE ON WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Ocean County Dpt. Of Corrections v. Policeman’s Benevolent Association, Local 258
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division – Unpublished Opinion
A-2974-23; 2025 WL 2938311
Decided: 10/16/2025
Background:
Correctional police officer Maria Adamopoulos “Adamopoulos” had a work-related injury and was out on workers’ compensation leave. When she returned, she expected to receive holiday pay for the holidays that fell within the time she was out on workers’ compensation leave. Adamopoulos was denied pay for the holidays and the county stated this was because she was paid worker’s compensation during the time. It was argued that Adamopoulos did not receive her full rate of pay during the holiday and rather received the workers’ compensation rate. The Arbitrator ordered that Adamopoulos should be compensated at 100% pay for all the holidays that occurred while she was out on leave. The County filed an Order to show cause arguing that the relief ordered by the Arbitrator violated the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court granted the County’s order to show cause and vacated the award finding it was against public policy because it conflicted with the Act and the Act’s calculation of temporary benefits.
Holding:
The court concluded that the arbitrator’s decision was not against public policy or the Act. The language of the collective bargaining agreement provided that holiday pay was a benefit and not compensation in lieu of wages. Therefore, it was not preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial court’s order was reversed, and the arbitrator’s award was reinstated.
Reversed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Assembly Bill 4750
Expands certain employer reporting requirements to include entities that employ or contract with individuals for financial compensation, including ridesharing and delivery technology platforms.
Last Action: January 14, 2025 – Received in the Senate, Referred to Senate Labor Committee
Assembly Bill 5198/S3772
Concerns valuation of board and lodging with respect to workers’ compensation.
Last Action: January 23, 2025 – Reported and Referred to Assembly Appropriations Committee
Assembly Bill 2637/S794
Concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships.
Last Action: December 5, 2024 – Reported from Senate Committee as a Substitute, 2nd Reading
