PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
8/1/2026 – 8/31/2026
EMPLOYER VS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
J&S Technology Solutions v. Wilben Gonzalez et al.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 4, 2026
Issues:
Whether the Board erred in concluding that Claimant established that J&S was his employer as the evidence points to Claimant being an independent contractor? Whether Dish Network was Claimant’s statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Act?
Background:
Claimant filed a claim petition naming J&S as his employer. He was installing a satellite dish for a customer of Dish Network, who contracted with J&S to install its satellite dishes. Claimant signed an Independent Contractor Agreement (IC Agreement) but this agreement expired in June 2016. He was not presented with another IC Agreement to sign. Claimant later began working for J&S full-time, after which he could not refuse jobs, and was told by J&S’s owner that he could not work for anyone else. In 2019 Claimant was laid off. He was rehired a few months later. J&S trained Claimant on how to install and repair Dish Network satellite dishes. Claimant used his own tools but could purchase them from J&S if needed. J&S provided the major equipment needed to install the satellite dishes. Claimant wore a uniform provided to him by J&S that had both J&S and Dish Network logos on it. J&S paid Claimant by the job and issued him a 1099. Claimant received his daily job and route assignments via a J&S and Dish Network encrypted application that tracked where Claimant was throughout the day. Claimant did not and could not refuse any jobs, and he was prohibited by J&S from working for any competing satellite installers. J&S had the right to fire Claimant. Claimant had no discretion to direct the manner in which he installed satellites. The WCJ found that Claimant was an employee of J&S. The WCJ also found that, at the time of injury, J&S did not have a workers’ compensation policy in place that would cover Claimant’s injury due to J&S’s failure to pay the renewal premium for the Brickstreet policy, and Dish Network was a statutory employer under Section 302(a) of the Act. Finally, the WCJ found that Dish Network did not justifiably rely on a certain certificate when it permitted J&S to remain an active installer for Dish Network. The WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim Petition and denied J&S’s Petition to Join Brickstreet as neither J&S nor Dish Network established that Brickstreet was estopped from denying coverage. The WCJ ordered J&S and Dish Network to pay Claimant’s indemnity and medical benefits, with the Guaranty Fund being secondarily liable should either J&S or Dish Network default. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Board, which affirmed.
Holding:
Control over the work to be completed and the manner in which it is to be performed are the primary factors in determining employee status. Other relevant factors include withholding of wages for income taxes, acquisition of (or failure to acquire) WC insurance, and the existence of a signed contractor agreement. Because every case is fact specific, it is unnecessary that each of these factors be present to make the determination of the nature of the employment relationship. Appling this to the facts, there was no error or abuse of discretion in the Board’s conclusion that Claimant met his burden of proving an employment relationship with J&S. As for the IC Agreement and the use of the Form 1099, the Court has recognized that there are some factors, controlled by employers, that must be viewed with caution because of the potential for employers to use them as a means of avoiding legitimate WC liability. Additionally, the Board erred in concluding that Dish Network had liability for Claimant’s work injury as a statutory employer. Dish Network’s estoppel argument is predicated on the Certificate, which certified that a WC insurance policy had been issued to J&S by Brickstreet beginning September 25, 2019, upon which Dish Network relied to continue allowing J&S to install satellite dishes. It contains a WC policy number, a coverage period from September 25, 2019, to September 25, 2020, and the WC coverage limits per accident or disease. The Certificate names Dish Network as the “Certificate Holder.” Finally, the Certificate states that if any of the policies described therein were cancelled before they expired “notice will be delivered in accordance with the policy provisions.” The Certificate was needed for J&S to meet its contractual obligations, and, absent the Certificate, Dish Network would no longer use J&S as an installer. Based on the Certificate containing certification that J&S had a WC policy covering the next year, Dish Network continued using J&S. Accordingly, Dish Network, a third party, relied upon misrepresentation of the fact that J&S had WC coverage after September 25, 2019, which induced Dish Network to continue using J&S notwithstanding its uninsured status. This misrepresentation of the fact of J&S’s WC coverage, ultimately, resulted in prejudice to Dish Network, it being declared Claimant’s statutory employer and liable for Claimant’s WC injury under Section 302(a). Accordingly, the Board erred in affirming the WCJ’s conclusion that Dish Network could be named Claimant’s statutory employer. The Board’s Order in this regard is reversed. As Dish Network has already paid the indemnity and medical benefits awarded based on J&S’s inability to pay those sums, a remand is appropriate because Dish Network established that the facts in this case give rise to the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is a question of law and that the Board and WCJ erred in holding otherwise. The Court reversed the Board’s Order in that regard, and remanded the matter for additional proceedings.
Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part, and Remanded.
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON
The Majority would conclude that the WCJ erred, first, by determining Claimant’s employment status as a matter of fact when it is a question of law, and second, by failing to evaluate the relevant documentary evidence of record and support the determination with record-based reasoning as the Act requires. While reasonable caution is warranted where documentary evidence concerning employment status is at issue, the Majority effectively condones the WCJ’s utter disregard of this evidence, whether purposeful or not, which the Board did not correct by returning the case to the WCJ for a revised decision that properly addressed the evidence of record.
PA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
Donnette Lonjuin v. Trustees of the Univ. of PA (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 25, 2026
Issue:
Whether the Claimant’s appeal to the Court should be quashed?
Background:
Claimant injured her left shoulder while working for Employer. In 2023 a WCJ granted Claimant’s claim petition and awarded indemnity and medical benefits related to the injury. In 2024, the parties participated in voluntary mediation but did not resolve the matter. Thereafter, Employer filed a petition to terminate Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits. The Claimant filed a motion seeking the WCJ’s recusal, based upon an email from Employer. The specified WCJ held a hearing on the motion for recusal. Employer’s counsel opposed the motion and that the email merely reflected that the nature of the case changed after settlement negotiations due to the independent medical examination. The WCJ denied the recusal motion. The order was certified for immediate appeal to the Board, which affirmed.
Holding:
The Court first had to determine if the order affirming the denial of the recusal motion is immediately appealable to this Court and looked at the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. The order also did not fall within the categories of interlocutory orders designated as appealable by right, and Claimant did not seek permission of this Court to appeal from the Board’s order. Therefore, the Board’s order is only immediately appealable if it is a collateral order involving an issue separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, a right too important to be denied review, and presents a question that will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final judgment. The appeal did not meet the collateral order standard. Accordingly, the Board’s order was a non-reviewable, interlocutory order, and the Court quashed the appeal.
Affirmed.
IMPAIRMENT RATING EVALUATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL
Sherri M. Connelly v. Keystone Home Health Service (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 31, 2026
Issue:
Whether Act 111 of 2018, is unconstitutional?
Background:
The WCJ granted the Employer’s IRE modification petition and modified Claimant’s indemnity benefits from total to partial disability pursuant to the IRE conducted on May 3, 2023. Claimant petitioned for review of the order of the Board, which affirmed the amended decision and order of a WCJ.
Holding:
In the instant matter, there was no dispute that Claimant had received over 104 weeks of benefits prior to the IRE on May 3, 2023; there was no dispute regarding the qualifications of the IRE reviewer; there was no dispute that the reviewer calculated the Claimant’s whole-person impairment rating per the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition; and there was no medical evidence submitted in opposition to the accuracy of these calculations. Claimant’s argument regarding the application of Act 111 has already been addressed and rejected by Commonwealth Court. Act 111 applies to claimants injured prior to its effective date, and it is not unconstitutional to do so, as long as the IRE does not pre-date Act 111. Further, Act 111 applies to all injuries occurring prior to its enactment, including injuries occurring prior to June 24, 1996. Further, there is no violation of the non-delegation doctrine. Finally, Act 111’s passage did not violate Article III, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because an amendment added during Senate consideration shared a nexus with the original bill when both related to the common purpose of accuracy in county assessments.
Affirmed.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
THE REQUIRMENT OF A COMPROMISE AND RELEASE HEARING
Trustees of The University of Pennsylvania v. Natalie Braas, et all (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: August 20, 2026.
Issues:
Whether the WCJ was required to hold a hearing before issuing a decision on the Termination and UR Petitions and correctly issued her decision terminating Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits and denying the UR Petitions before rendering a decision on the Petition for Approval? Whether the Board was correct in ordering a remand?
Background:
Claimant sustained a work-related injury while moving a patient. Employer filed a Termination Petition. Providers filed UR review petitions. Employer filed its briefs with respect to the Termination Petition and UR Petitions. Prior to Claimant filing her brief, the parties reached an amicable resolution. Employer filed a Petition for Approval. The Petition for Approval was assigned to the WCJ under the same dispute number as the Termination and UR Petitions. Paragraph 19 of the C&R Agreement provided that it fully resolved any and all other work injury claims suffered while Claimant was employed with the Employer and that the Agreement did not affect whether Claimant fully recovered under the pending Termination Petition or whether certain treatment in the pending Petitions for Review of the Utilization Review Determinations was reasonable and necessary. Thereafter, Claimant and her providers filed their briefs with respect to the Termination and UR Petitions. After the C&R was uploaded, the WCJ notified the parties that the Agreement “must resolve all issues raised by all petitions or it will not be entertained.” The WCJ did not hold a hearing on the Petition for Approval. Instead, the WCJ issued a decision and order on the merits of the Termination and UR Petitions, granting the Termination Petitions and denying the UR Petitions. The decision contained no findings of fact or conclusions of law mentioning the C&R Petition, other than to order that it was dismissed with prejudice. Claimant appealed to the Board, which agreed that the WCJ violated the requirement in Section 449 that an expedited hearing must be held when a Petition for Approval is filed and that the WCJ erred in not admitting the C&R Agreement into evidence and by issuing a decision on the Termination and UR Petitions without first addressing on the record and holding a hearing on the Petition for Approval, which was intertwined with the pending dispute.
Holding:
The WCJ erred as a matter of law by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval was presented to the WCJ. Despite the plain language of Section 449(b) the WCJ failed to do hold a hearing and instead instructed the parties to resolve all issues raised by all petitions or it will not be entertained. There is nothing in Section 449(b) of the Act that allows the WCJ to instruct the parties in this manner. The WCJ’s instruction in this regard was contrary to established law. It has long been held that parties to a C&R Agreement may resolve a claimant’s entitlement to future indemnity benefits and yet leave issues open for the WCJ to decide in the Agreement. The WCJ was not free to forego the hearing on the Petition for Approval, and it was irrelevant that neither party requested a “stay” of Termination and UR Petitions pending a decision on the Petition for Approval. Especially as the Approval petition was already consolidated. A WCJ may refuse to hold a hearing on a Petition for Approval if the petition is withdrawn, or where it does not comply with statutory requirements. However, that was not the case here and there was no indication that either party wanted to back out of the settlement. Therefore, there was no reason to omit the hearing on the Petition for Approval or dismiss that Petition as moot after she ruled on the merits of the Termination and UR Petitions. The new WCJ will have to decide what happens to the UR and Termination Petitions in light of the parties’ Agreement. It is necessary for the WCJ to determine whether the C&R Agreement specifically reserves the right of the moving party to proceed with the post-C&R litigation and that such litigation is unaffected by the C&R Agreement or whether it should be dismissed as moot. The Board did not commit any error as it passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the Termination and UR Petitions and instead left it for the WCJ to decide in conjunction with the Petition for Approval after a hearing.
Affirmed.
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
SUBSEQUENT PETITION
Williams Bolds v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Decision
Decided: August 4, 2026
Issue:
Whether technical res judicata bars the current Claim Petition?
Background:
Claimant tested positive for COVID-19 while employed as a police officer by the City of Philadelphia. Employer designated Claimant’s time off work as “E-Time,” or “excused time.” Employer created the E-Time designation during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide its employees full pay without depleting sick or vacation time. Later, Employer discovered that several police officers, including Claimant, remained out of work with COVID-19 and continued to be paid under the E-Time designation, but they had not reported a work injury or entered Employer’s injured-on-duty program. Employer sent Claimant a letter informing him that he would be removed from E-Time status and, if he continued to remain out of work, he would be paid through accrued sick and vacation time. Thereafter, Employer issued an Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial, denying any liability for Claimant’s alleged work-related exposure to the COVID-19 virus. Claimant began using his accrued sick and vacation time. Claimant then filed the Reinstatement and Penalty Petition alleging that Employer unilaterally terminated Claimant’s workers’ compensation benefits with the NCD, after accepting the claim for a COVID-19 injury as a matter of law through the payment of wages in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits; the E-Time. The WCJ issued a decision denying the Petitions as Employer did not intend to pay him wages in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits. The WCJ further noted in a footnote to her decision: “The denial of the Reinstatement Petition does not preclude Claimant from filing a [c]laim [p]etition within the [s]tatute of [l]imitations.” Claimant filed a timely appeal and the Board affirmed. Claimant appealed the Board’s ruling, and this Court affirmed. Claimant then filed the instant Claim Petition. The WCJ issued a decision dismissing the Claim Petition with prejudice on both res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
Res judicata applies as the previously litigated Reinstatement Petition did not involve a distinct cause of action and theory of relief. Technical res judicata may be applied to bar claims that were actually litigated as well as those matters that should have been litigated. A party cannot avoid res judicata simply by varying the legal theory for relief or by recasting the nomenclature for the relief requested. Further, collateral estoppel is also applicable as the Claim Petition does not involve a different issue. The proceedings involved the same parties acting in the same capacities. Also, there was identity of the thing sued upon and causes of action. Claimant initially sought relief through the Reinstatement Petition and is now litigating a Claim Petition. However, Claimant cannot avoid the preclusive effect of technical res judicata simply by varying the legal theory for relief and recasting the nomenclature for the relief requested. Claimant was aware of the grounds for the Claim Petition at the time he filed his Reinstatement Petition, and therefore he should have litigated all his legal theories in the same proceeding. The WCJ’s comment in a footnote to her decision that the denial of the Reinstatement Petition did not preclude Claimant from filing a claim petition within the statute of limitations does not insulate Claimant from the application of technical res judicata. Under Pennsylvania law, workers’ compensation claimants are not authorized to file serial petitions seeking benefits for the same injury. The mandate to construe the Act to effectuate its humanitarian objectives must be balanced against the purpose of the technical res judicata doctrine to shield parties from the burden of re-litigating a claim with the same parties and to protect the judiciary from the corresponding inefficiency and confusion that re-litigation of a claim would breed. The technical res judicata criteria are clearly met here, this is not a borderline case.
Affirmed.
RULES OF EVIDENCE
HEARSAY
Prism Contractors, Inc. v. Roger Attwood (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: August 28, 2026
Issue:
Whether the Board erred in affirming the WCJ as the WCJ relied on the hearsay opinions of non-testifying doctors?
Background:
Claimant suffered a traumatic left lower-leg injury while transitioning between roof pitches on a residential job site. The treating physicians ultimately diagnosed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) as one of the injuries. Claimant filed a Review Petition seeking to amend the injury description to include CRPS and, initially, a lumbar spine condition.
Holding:
The Board did not err in affirming the WCJ’s decision based on his purported error in permitting the Claimant’s doctor to rely on the prior reports of treating physicians during his testimony. An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. Employer properly preserved its objections to the doctor’s testimony to the extent it referred to medical documents authored by Claimant’s prior medical providers. Nevertheless, the doctor testified that he customarily relies upon documents such as those authored by the above-mentioned providers in rendering his expert medical opinion as to the causation of an injured patient’s diagnoses. Therefore, this met the hearsay exception under Rule 703. The WCJ properly allowed this testimony which referenced these medical records into the record and relied upon such testimony in rendering the finding to expand Claimant’s work injury description to include CRPS of the left lower extremity.
Affirmed.
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
House Bill 183 is now Senate Bill 1094.
A few months ago, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, House L&I Committee, voted on what was then designated as HB 183. This Bill expands access to workers’ compensation disfigurement benefits by increasing the duration of eligibility from up to 275 weeks to a new level of up to 400 weeks, extending the benefit to the entire body, and not just to the head, face and neck, and allowing these benefits to be paid simultaneously with indemnity benefits. The bill was passed by the House on April 7, 2025, and has now been referred to the Senate Labor & Industry Committee. It is now under Senate Bill 1094 and has yet to be reported from the committee.
Other Selected Proposed Legislation of Interest in the 2025-2026 session
The following selected amendments to the PA Workers’ Compensation Act have been proposed, but as of this date are in early stages, and no formal vote has been held, and these are referred to their respective L&I Committees:
In the Senate: (these are still in committee)
Senate Bill 801 – Seeks to clarify that the Act provides the exclusive remedy for any injury or disease that may arise out of hazardous occupational exposure, whether the disease is compensable or not.
Senate Bill 894 – Seeks to clarify the “Independent Contractor Classification.”
Senate Bill 1151 – Removal of Clinical Practice Requirement for Physicians Performing Impairment Rating Evaluations (IREs).
Senate Bill 1215 – Addressing Excessive Costs for Prescription Topical Drugs in Workers’ Compensation. Reported as “committed” effective June 2026.
House Bill 2049 – Raising Workers’ Compensation Burial Benefits. (Sent to the senate on June 18, 2026)
House Bill 2087 – Ensuring that volunteer firefighters and EMTs are covered under workers’ compensation when injured during fundraising activities. (Sent to the senate on April 2026)
Approved by the Senate on March 24, 2026 – Sent to the House and now referred out of Committee as amended in April 2026.
Senate Bill 1053 – Seeks to clarify workers compensation coverage for EMS Volunteers.
In the House Only: (these are still in committee)
House Bill 1766 – Workers’ Compensation Coverage of Prescribed Medical Cannabis (Formerly HB 1079).
House Bill 1998 – Modernizing and Improving Medical Treatment in Workers’ Compensation
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
8/1/2026 – 8/31/2026
MOTION FOR MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
Munoz v. Costco
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
A-3829-24; 2026 WL 2330191
Decided: 8/12/2026
Background:
Petitioner Rocardo Munoz was working part time in Costco when he injured his right knee. He immediately reported the injury and received treatment. The petitioner had surgery. He was returned to light duty work and subsequently returned to full duty work. He continued to complain of symptoms. The doctor continued to keep him at full duty. The petitioner later resigned and listed his reason as personal reasons. He told his manager that he could not keep working because his knee was too painful. He attempted to contact the workers’ compensation adjustor numerous times for further treatment, but the phone calls were not returned. A representative for Costco testified that when the petitioner resigned, he did not mention his knee or knee injury. He stated the petitioner told her that he had a family member who was ill and that he could not commit to being at work. When asked about this, the petitioner admitted he visited his sick father in Puerto Rico a few times.
The petitioner returned to his treating doctor who stated that the current symptoms were related to pre-existing degenerative issues and not the tear. He further recommended the petitioner continue working full duty. He remained at maximum medical improvement for the work injury. The petitioner filed a Motion for temporary and or/medical benefits seeking wage loss benefits as well as medical treatment. The court ordered the petitioner to undergo a new medical exam with a different doctor. The new doctor testified that the work injury likely exacerbated the petitioner’s symptoms. The court granted the Motion.
Holding:
On appeal, Costco argued the court erred in discounting their expert’s opinion that the injury aggravated/accelerated/exacerbated the petitioner’s underlying knee condition and awarding the petitioner TTD (wage loss) after he had voluntarily resigned from work. The court considered the credibility of the witnesses, and the credibility determinations and found they were well supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. The court further did not find that the petitioner voluntarily took himself out of the workplace. He requested light duty and this was denied. The court made factual findings supported by the evidence and applied the relevant law. There is no reason to disturb the award.
Affirmed.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BAR
Teresa Dunne, et al. v. Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Services At Swewell, LLC, et al.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
A-2559-24; 2026 WL 2363966
Decided: 8/14/2026
Background:
This is a COVID-19 wrongful death and survivor action. The plaintiff, Teresa Dunne filed suit individually and in her capacity as the Administrator of the Estate of Louis Doto, Sr., Ann Marie Trasatti, and Louis Doto, Jr. (Doto, Jr.) appealing various orders. Louis Doto Sr. (Doto) was employed by BP & SC Services, Inc. (BP). BP leased Doto to Advanced Subacute. Advanced Subacute controlled the details of Doto’s work and paid his wages. BP was also responsible for securing workers’ compensation coverage for Doto. Doto contracted COVID-19 and passed away from the disease. Doto’s estate filed a workers’ compensation claim petition and received a workers’ compensation award for his death claim. Plaintiffs filed complaints with the Law Division alleging the defendants carelessly, negligently, recklessly, grossly negligently, or willfully and intentionally disregarded threats to Doto’s health and safety. One of the Defendant’s arguments was that the plaintiff’s claim was barred under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) because the estate received a workers’ compensation award arising from the death. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment and argued they are not precluded by the workers’ compensation bar because Doto was not an employee of Advanced Subacute. Regarding the WCA argument, the Judge found that the contract between BP and Advanced Subacute states that it is an employee leasing agreement. The fact that Doto remained an employee of BP while leased to Advanced Subacute, does not negate the fact that he is an employee of Advanced Subacute as well. The Judge further found that no reasonable jury could find that the intentional wrong exception to the workers’ compensation bar applies here. Advanced Subacute’s OSHA violations for a group of staff that Doto occasionally came into contact with was at best negligent. No jury could find that it was intentional.
Holding:
On appeal regarding the workers’ compensation bar, the Court determined that Doto was an employee of both BP and Advanced Subacute. There is nothing in the record to suggest Advanced Subacute acted in a manner supporting an exception to the WCA bar. It was noted that at the worst, they failed to follow some precautions during an unpredictable crisis.
Affirmed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Assembly Bill 4617
Concerns certain workers’ compensation supplemental benefits and funding method.
Last Action: March 10, 2026 – Introduced, Referred to Assembly Labor Committee
Senate Bill 3984/A1023
Requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances.
Last Action: March 19, 2026 – Introduced in the Senate, Referred to Senate Commerce Committee
Senate Bill 3342
Increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75.
Last Action: February 5, 2026 – Introduced in the Senate, Referred to Senate Judiciary Committee
Senate Bill 3571/A3548
Provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers’ compensation claim regardless of outside employment.
Last Action: May 7, 2026 – Reported and Referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee
Assembly Bill 4827
Requires Administrative Law Judges to be enrolled in Workers Compensation Judges Part of PERS.
Last Action: May 4, 2026 – Introduced, Referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee
Senate Bill 4381
Exempts election worker compensation from taxation.
Last Action: June 1, 2026 – Introduced in the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee
