PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
12/1/2025 – 12/31/2025
MENTAL/MENTAL INJURIES
POLICE OFFICER – ABNORMAL WORKING CONDITIONS
Steve Russo v. Upper Darby Township (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
Decided: December 8, 2025
Issues:
Whether the WCJ erroneously applied the mental/mental burden of proof to this mental injury claim rather than the appropriate physical/mental burden of proof? Whether, even if the mental/mental standard had been correctly applied, the record clearly indicates that the claimant endured abnormal working conditions?
Background:
Claimant was a 14-year veteran officer of the Police Department when he was involved in a violent struggle that concluded with the death of a wanted suspect. The Township issued an NTCP, which converted by operation of law to a medical-only Notice of Compensation Payable. Claimant returned to work on March 1, 2021, but was placed again on administrative leave on December 15, 2021. In a subsequent Petition, Claimant sought to add PTSD, depression, and an injury to the right elbow to the list of accepted work injuries. Claimant filed his Claim Petition on the same day seeking wage loss benefits. The WCJ denied and dismissed the Review and Claim Petitions. Notably, the WCJ rejected Claimant’s psychological expert’s conclusion that Claimant suffered from PTSD and reasoned that there was no compensable mental injury as a result of the incident on November 20, 2020. Claimant appealed to the Board, arguing, that the WCJ capriciously disregarded Claimant’s psychological expert’s “uncontroverted” testimony, failed to provide adequate reasoning for her partial rejection of Claimant’s or his doctor’s testimony, and erroneously concluded that the NTCP’s injury description was accurate. The Board affirmed by a 4-2 vote. This appeal followed.
Holding:
When a claimant asserts a claim under the physical/mental standard, a claimant must prove that a physical work injury requiring medical treatment caused a psychological injury. A claimant will be entitled to compensation for a mental/mental injury if he can demonstrate that the injury resulted from abnormal working conditions, not merely the result of a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. Claimant maintains that his physical injuries due to the violent assault cannot be fairly disputed and he is entitled to the physical/mental standard for the PTSD claim. In this case, the WCJ correctly pointed out that the files from the Penn Presbyterian ER recorded only complaints of soreness and pain and that, without any treatment administered, Claimant was discharged and permitted to walk out on his own. Thus, the WCJ properly concluded that Claimant was “overall well on November 20, 2020, and … wasn’t diagnosed with any medical condition” on that day. As Claimant’s pain and soreness complaints were secondary to a mentally injuring event and were themselves not serious enough to require medical treatment, the physical/mental standard is inapplicable to the instant matter. As to the Mental/Mental Standard, the Supreme Court expressed displeasure with this Court’s approach in Payes I of breaking the entire incident into component parts, where each part, standing on its own, might be safely determined to be a ‘normal’ working condition for a police officer.” The fact that another state trooper had once struck a pedestrian does not make the incident here a “normal” working condition. “Abnormal working conditions need not be “unique” working conditions…. Indeed, by any measure, and irrespective of [the trooper’s] testimony, what happened here was an extraordinary event. For this reason, we hold here that as a matter of law, such a singular extraordinary event is an “abnormal” working condition.” The WCJ’s finding that the incident was a normal condition for a police officer who works in the Township was erroneous for two main reasons. First, the WCJ focused on one aspect or another of the incident rather than the full convergence of events. Second, the WCJ’s conclusion is erroneous as it is not even supported by the testimony cited as its basis. Mental injury cases are “highly fact-sensitive,” and that such a fact-intensive inquiry normally calls for deference to the WCJ’s factual findings. However, the ultimate determination of whether an employee has established ‘abnormal working conditions’ is a question of law reviewable on appeal. The reasons cited by the WCJ for rejecting Claimant’s Psychologist’s testimony were nonsensical. A reasonable observer would not expect the psychologist to be deeply familiar with the details of Claimant’s shoulder pain. Thus, this was an arbitrary level of scrutiny. Further, the WCJ mischaracterized the expert’s words. Finaly, the WCJ Decision revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of expert medical testimony. A reasonable observer would find it entirely sufficient that Claimant testified at length about the profound decline in his emotional state before his eventual treatment with Dr. Solomon. Such elements of Claimant’s testimony corroborate, rather than undermine, the doctor’s conclusions. The record does not support the WCJ’s findings and the rejection of the doctor’s testimony constituted reversible error. In all, the WCJ’s conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, and lacking in support in the record.
Reversed and Remanded.
In a Concurring Opinion By Senior Judge Leadbetter – The Judge noted her view as to the continued viability of the “abnormal working conditions” doctrine, expressing the belief that it is time to scrap the “abnormal working conditions” doctrine altogether and hold that if there is clear proof of a disabling work-related mental injury, it should be compensable.
In A Concurring And Dissenting Opinion By Judge Fizzano Cannon – the Judge agreed with the Majority that the lack of post-incident medical treatment here indicates that Claimant’s physical pain and soreness were “secondary” to the mental components of his condition and that the physical/mental standard for a psychological injury was not applicable here. However, she cannot agree with the Majority that the incident here qualifies as an abnormal working condition.
TIMELINESS OF APPEALS
NO REASONABLE EXCUSE
Jonathan Henry Gamble, Jr. v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 17, 2025
Issue:
Whether the Board properly quashed Claimant’s appeals as untimely?
Background:
Claimant petitioned the Court, pro se, for review of the Board’s August 1, 2024 order granting Employer’s Motion to Quash Claimant’s Appeals, and affirming the WCJ’s decisions that granted Employer’s Termination Petitions. The Board consolidated the appeals. The Board granted Employer’s Motion to Quash. The Claimant appealed to the Court. Many months after his original appeal, the Claimant filed a Motion for Nunc Pro Tunc Relief to Correct WC Appeal Filing Date. Claimant sought to have the Court correct this to reflect that Claimant’s appeal was timely filed on October 21, 2023, and issue a subpoena to the WC Automation and Integration System (WCAIS) Records Unit for him to obtain the full electronic filing history and metadata relating to his appeal based on an undated email in response to a “Gmail Request for Verification of Sent Email to WCAIS” stating: “[Claimant,] [P]lease note your email was received by the [Board] on 10/21/2023.
Holding:
This email was not supplied to or considered by the Board, and the Court could not now consider it. Any party in interest may, within 20 days after notice of a WCJ’s adjudication shall have been served upon him, take an appeal to the Board. 77 P.S. § 853. Claimant’s appeals to the Board were due October 21 and 22, 2023, respectively. Because October 21, 2023, was a Saturday, and October 22, 2023, was a Sunday, both appeals to the Board were due October 23, 2023. The failure to file an appeal within the requisite time period is jurisdictional. The deadline for filing an appeal cannot be extended as a matter of grace or mere indulgence. Because Claimant’s appeals were filed one day after the deadline, the Board properly granted the Motion to Quash and dismissed Claimant’s appeals as untimely.
Affirmed.
REINSTATEMENT FOLLWING LAY-OFF
EXPERT TESTIMONY – COMPETENT
Clearwater Construction Company and BITCO v. Kenneth Wilso (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Unpublished Memorandum Opinion
Decided: December 10, 2025
Issues:
Whether the WCJ erred in finding Claimant disabled as of the date Claimant accepted a voluntary layoff despite his full-duty release to work? Whether Claimant’s medical evidence was incompetent?
Background:
Claimant worked for Employer as a flatbed truck driver/yard laborer. Employer issued a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable accepting that Claimant suffered a work-related injury. Later, Employer issued a Notice Stopping Temporary Compensation and a Notice of Denial indicating that Claimant’s disability ended when Claimant was released to return to work without restrictions and at his pre-injury wages. Claimant filed a Claim Petition seeking full disability from the date of the lay-off, onward. The WCJ credited claimant’s testimony and the testimony of his medical expert. Ongoing benefits were awarded. The Board affirmed.
Holding:
Despite a release to full duty without restrictions, the WCJ simply did not credit that Claimant was capable of such performance. Therefore, Employer’s argument that Claimant returned to work without restrictions because he had a full-duty release to work is meritless. Moreover, the fact that Claimant did not seek medical treatment does not mean that Claimant had necessarily recovered from his work injury. Under these circumstances, Claimant is entitled to the presumption that his loss of earnings is causally related to the work injury. The presumption applies where the claimant returns with restriction to a job other than the time-of-injury job. Further, the expert’s testimony was not incompetent simply because he was unaware that Claimant complained in 2012 and 2019 of neck and back pain. The doctor’s opinions were unchanged by the revelation of prior lower back injuries and complaints, with the doctor opining that if there were prior problems they were aggravated by the incident on December 26, 2019. His opinion is supported by the fact that the Claimant was able to perform his job without missing time from work until he was injured in December of 2019. When cross-examined, he indicated that Claimant’s past complaints in 2012 and 2019 of back and neck pain would not alter his opinions. He explained that if those prior incidents were severe, he would have expected Claimant to seek more medical intervention, and that the only time Claimant missed work was after the December 26, 2019 incident. A medical expert’s opinion is not rendered incompetent unless it is solely based on inaccurate or false information. You must review the opinion of a medical expert as a whole, and even inaccurate information will not render the opinion incompetent unless it is dependent on those inaccuracies. His Opinion was not incompetent, and Employer’s claim that he did not have “a complete grasp” of Claimant’s physical condition prior to the work injury is without merit.
Affirmed.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION
ATTORNEY INTERVENOR AND FEE CALCULATION
Brian Puricelli, Petitioner v. Georgia Kolbas Philadelphia (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania – Published Opinion
December 23, 2025
Issues:
Whether the Board erred to affirm the WCJ when the WCJ granted a Review petition and changed a fee contract from contingency to quantum meruit? Whether a Mistake must be plead to state a review petition?
Background:
In May 2014, while working for the Employer, Claimant suffered a tick bite and developed a work-related Lyme Disease injury. Claimant filed a Review Petition seeking review of the Fee Order approving Former Counsel’s attorney’s fee, and noting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suspended Former Counsel from the practice of law, until further definitive action by the Court. Current Counsel requested Former Counsel forward a copy of Former Counsel’s file and quantum meruit statement to Current Counsel. Former Counsel filed a Petition to Intervene and Dismiss requesting the WCJ dismiss Claimant’s Review Petition. At the first hearing, the WCJ did not permit Former Counsel to participate, although he appeared and observed the hearing. The WCJ explained Former Counsel needed to file a petition to intervene so he could become a party. At the second hearing, Former Counsel appeared, representing himself as an interested party, and admitted to being suspended with consent. While Former Counsel represented Claimant for several years, the WCJ found Claimant wished to terminate Former Counsel’s representation and have Current Counsel represent her in the ongoing claim. The WCJ considered that Former Counsel provided services to Claimant over the years. The WCJ noted that, for this work, Former Counsel has been collecting a weekly 20% attorney’s fee and found that he has thus been reasonably compensated for his past services. The Board affirmed. Former Counsel petitioned the Court for review.
Holding:
The WCJ is the ultimate fact finder in workers’ compensation cases and is entitled to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Where the amount and difficulty of the work performed by the attorney is reasonably related to the fee award, this Court will not disturb the award. Where a claimant decides to terminate the services of an attorney with whom she has a contingent fee agreement, the attorney is not deprived of his right to recover on a quantum meruit a proper amount for the services which he has rendered. The WCJ’s authority to address this dispute, was properly before the WCJ. The WCJ had jurisdiction to resolve this fee dispute. The WCJ adequately balanced Claimant’s right to select an attorney of her choice with both Former Counsel’s and Current Counsel’s expectations of receiving reasonable legal fees. The constitutional guarantees of due process apply to proceedings before administrative tribunals, including the WCJ and the Board. However, here there was no violation of Former Counsel’s due process rights by the WCJ or the Board. Although the WCJ did not permit Former Counsel to participate in the first hearing, the WCJ allowed Former Counsel to represent himself at the second hearing and accepted Former Counsel’s position statement, which she considered in rendering her Decision. Thus, Former Counsel had the opportunity to and, in fact, did present evidence regarding the work he performed for Claimant. Accordingly, neither the WCJ nor the Board violated Former Counsel’s due process rights. The Court did not agree with Former Counsel’s assertion that the Board erred by addressing Claimant’s improperly filed petition for review in this matter in which she did not assert a “mistake” was made in the initial fee agreement. Claimants in compensation cases are not required to observe strict rules of pleading, as it is not the policy of this court to strike down meritorious claims merely because of a failure to file a petition under the proper section of the statute. If the proof adduced indicates a right to relief in accordance with any provisions of the Act, the petition will be considered to have been brought under the appropriate section. Because Claimant proved she was entitled to relief under the Act, it is inconsequential whether her petition was filed under the proper section of the statute. Therefore, the Board did not err by addressing Claimant’s Review Petition.
Affirmed.
PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
House Bill 183
A few months ago, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, House L&I Committee, voted on what is now designated as HB 183. This Bill expands access to workers’ compensation disfigurement benefits by increasing the duration of eligibility from up to 275 weeks to a new level of up to 400 weeks, extending the benefit to the entire body, and not just to the head, face and neck, and allowing these benefits to be paid simultaneously with indemnity benefits. The bill was passed by the House on April 7, 2025, and has now been referred to the Senate Labor & Industry Committee. It is worthy of note that this bill was amended, just prior to passage, to apply to injuries for which “permanent disfigurement was reached” after the effective date of the provision, whereas it was previously intended to only apply to injuries sustained on or after the effective date. As of today, there has been no new action.
NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CASE SUMMARIES
12/1/2025 – 12/31/2025
COVID-19 REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
Amato v. Township of Ocean School District
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
A-31; 2025 WL 3545621
Decided: 12/11/2025
Background:
The husband of a teacher who died from COVID-19 filed a claim against the school district alleging the teacher died due to an occupational disease. An Order was entered that the teacher was an essential employee and entitled to a rebuttable statutory presumption that she contracted COVID-19 in the course of her employment. The district appealed.
Holding:
The Court affirmed the Decision. A teacher was deemed an essential employee as the Governor delegated the responsibility to protect the public to the Office of Emergency Management and they had adopted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s list of essential employees, which included teachers. Additionally, the Department of public health issued two separate vaccine plans deeming teachers to be essential employees. As such, the claim was allowed to proceed with the rebuttal statutory presumption.
Affirmed.
NEW JERSEY LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
Assembly Bill 4750/S5006
Expands certain employer reporting requirements to include entities that employ or contract with individuals for financial compensation, including ridesharing and delivery technology platforms.
Last Action: December 18, 2025 – Received in the Assembly, 2nd Reading on Concurrence
Assembly Bill 5198/S3772
Concerns valuation of board and lodging with respect to workers’ compensation.
Last Action: December 22, 2025 – Passed Assembly (Passed Both Houses) (72-1-1)
Assembly Bill 2637/S794
Concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships.
Last Action: December 5, 2024 – Reported from Senate Committee as a Substitute, 2nd Reading
